SHRO-Articles

The Human Cost of Oil Exploration in Sudan

"The economic, political and strategic implications of the oil issue have seriously compounded and exacerbated the conflict and led to a deterioration of the overall situation of human rights and respect of humanitarian law"

— UN Special Rapporteur for Sudan, Leonard Franco.. 1999.

"The silence of powerful oil companies in the face of injustice and human rights violations cannot be seen neutral."

— Amnesty International Report of 2000.

"The underlying reality is that there has been, and probably still is, major displacement of civilian population related to oil extraction. Furthermore, oil has become a major focus of the fighting. Worse, the oil operations in Government of Sudan-controlled territory are used, even if to a limited extent, and possibly without the knowledge or approval of the oil companies, to directly support Government of Sudan military operations)"

— Harker Report prepared for the Canadian Foreign Affairs Ministry, January 2000.

"The Government and government-associated forces have implemented a scorched earth policy along parts of the oil pipeline and around some key oil facilities. These forces have injured persons seriously, destroyed villages, and driven out inhabitants in order to create an uninhabited security zone."

— US State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices -Sudan- 2000.

"In addition to aerial bombardment, and scorched-earth attacks by government troops, the government has armed Nuer proxies to fight anti-government Nuer."

— Jemera Rone, Human Rights Watch annual report -2000.

"Oil interests in the area had exacerbated the uprooting of people from their homes",

—Nicholas Siwingwa, WFP Deputy Country Director - February 2001.

The discovery of oil in Sudan goes back to April 1981 when the US firm Cheveron, which was drilling since 1975, announced the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in Bentiu area of Upper Nile Province in southern Sudan. A 1,400-kilometer pipeline was then planned to take the oil to a terminal south of Port Sudan for export. But the production was halted in 1984 after the kidnapping and subsequent execution of three expatriate Cheveron workers. Since then almost 2 million people are estimated to have been killed, 4.5 millions internally displaced and about two millions compelled to flee the country for neighbouring countries as a result of the civil war.

In addition to the conventional war, which is fought between the regular army of the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) other wars take place between various militias allied with the Government of Sudan (GOS) or the breakaway factions of the SPLA. These wars between militias frequently change sides according to their perceived interests and account for the majority of casualties. It is believed that during the last few years more people have lost their lives in inter-factional fighting among southerners than in armed confrontation with government forces.

The Sudan government forces no longer include the regular army but also organized militias known as the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), and the warriors (mujahedin) fighting a Jihad (holy war).

There is increasing evidence that children taken from the streets of Khartoum and other cities of the north, and forcibly recruited to the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) are taken to oil areas in southern Sudan to provide security to the oil companies. The minimum age for "lawful" recruitment to the PDF is 16, but in many cases children younger than 16 were taken forcibly to the training camps and the operation zones without informing their parents.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 182 defines a child in Article 2 as "all persons under the age of 18". Convention No 130 on the Minimum Age (1973) states that 18 years is the minimum age for admission to employment or work", and Article 3(a) of Convention No. 182 defines "forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict as one of "the worst forms of child labour".

In April 1997 the GOS reached a peace agreement with some southern factions that defected from the SPLA. The agreement enabled the government to control the oil territories of Upper Nile. In an appendix to the agreement, the apportioning of the oil income was listed. The exploitation of oil, which started in 1999 with the help of a consortium of Malaysian and Chinese state-owned oil firms and the Canadian firm Talisman, was carried out at a very high human cost.

When the GOS did not comply with most of the terms stipulated in the peace agreement the factions started to fight against each other and against the government army. To protect the security of the oil-producing areas the government forces and the allied troops have committed -and continue to commit- grave human rights violations, and most foreign companies involved in the oil business turn a blind eye to the violations. Some allegedly have got directly involved in committing the violations either by employing private military and security companies or by offering facilities to fighting groups.

In order to provide security for oil companies the GOS has launched a scorched-earth policy to clear the oil areas from local population and has created a "cordon sanitaire" by means of massive human destruction and displacement. Government bombers, helicopter gunships, tanks and artillery were used against the unarmed civilians. Tens of thousands of people were terrorized to leave their homes in Western Uper Nile (also known as Unity State, with its headquarters in Bentiu) since early 1999. The government army used ground attacks, helicopter gunship and indiscriminate high-altitude bombardment to clear the local population from the oil area. The massive displacement of the local population followed the deployment of additional weaponry and forces drafted in to protect oilfields. To prevent the return of displaced population the armed forces, the PDF, the Unity Police Forces and the Mujahedin adopted the tactics of destroying harvests, looting livestock and occupying the area. There are reports that some Arab tribes people are being resettled in the areas vacated by the indigenous population.
Among the areas most affected by the attacks and subsequent forced displacement since early 1999 are: Guk, Rik, Gumriak, Pariang, Mankien, Langkien, Neny, Duar, Koch, Toic and Leer north and south of Bentiu and the surrounding area. Thousands of people were killed in mass executions, more were forced to move for other areas such as the greater Bahr al-Gazal region, and tens of thousands were reported missing.

Thousands of people were displaced around Bentiu by fighting between different Nuer factions. Some of the faction militias were supplied with arms and deployed by the government. These militias summarily executed hundreds of civilians, raped and abducted women and burned and destroyed homesteads. It was the government's support to Paulino Matip ( a Nuer commander appointed as a Major General in the regular government army) that led to the resignation of Riak Mashar, who was appointed earlier as Assistant President and Chairman of the Coordination Council for the Southern States, in January 2000 disassociating himself from the peace agreement.

Construction of the oil pipeline running from the south to the Red Sea that began in 1997 was also carried out at a human cost. The local populations were allegedly displaced without compensation. It is alleged that armed guards, among Chinese oil workers, participated in this displacement.

Many reports said that the Haglig airstrip, newly built roads and premises operated by the consortium are used by the GOS army. According to Harker report the helicopter gunships and Antonov bombers of the GOS are armed and refuelled at Haglig airstrip from where they launch their attacks against civilians.

A new elevated (all weather) road leading 100 kilometres south of Bentiu has allowed Khartoum's heavy militarisation of the entire region. All the villages that once existed along this road have been razed to the ground by the government forces. Among the villages destroyed in service of concession security for Ludin Oil of Sweden and OMV of Austria are Kuac, Wicluak, Thoar, Daw, Gawjal. Dhorbor, Gier, Gieni, Chottiel, Bangna, Kuoynyang, Norchieng, Yar, Parjiek, Raal, Dhorchieng Chuol, Kuorong, Dhoreng, Kuerchieng, Pah and Lejak. Most of the people who used to live in these areas are now beyond the reach of the humanitarian aid organizations including Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS).

The companies are being accused of becoming either directly involved in the ongoing war, by siding with the GOS and its activities to "establish security" or by turning a blind eye to the severe violations committed on a large scale by the government forces and troops allied to them.

The oil revenues have strengthened the ability of the GOS to purchase arms and pursue war. It is reported that on the day of the export shipment of the first 600,000 barrels of oil, an import of shipment of 20 Polish T-55 tanks arrived in Port Sudan in violation of a UN embargo on arms transfers to the Sudanese government. Further arms transfers to Sudan from China and Bulgaria have also been reported. The government announced that its oil revenue, constituting 20 % of its 2000 revenue, would be used for defense, including an arms factory near Khartoum. Defense spending (in dollars) increased 96 % from 1998 to 2000. (Khartoum government gained around $500 million(US) from oil revenues in 2000).

The opposition announced, on many occasions, that the oil pipeline, as well as the oil fields and other oil company workers, were regarded as legitimate military targets and would come under attack. So far, the pipeline has been attacked at least three times, the first time in September 1999 near Atbara town, the second in November the same year near Erkawit town and the third time in January 2000 near Sinkat. The oil fields in Upper Nile were attacked once at least in January 2001 by the SPLA.
Attacks on the pipeline and oil fields endanger the safety of civilians, and the government's attempts to protect the oil facilities have led to more restrictions on basic freedoms and caused casualties among innocent people. For example, in March 2000 an army patrol assigned to protect the oil pipeline opened fire by mistake on a group of custom officers near Eddamer town (north of Khartoum) killing three and injuring several others.

The companies involved:

In addition to the Consortium GNPOC, that consists of Petronas, China National Petroleum Company, Talisman and GOS represented by Sudapet, which started production in 1999, an increasing number of companies are getting involved in the oil business in Sudan.

Another Consortium led by Lundin Oil and OMV has started drilling and seismic work in the summer of 2000. Total Fina/Elf started negotiations in February 2001and a growing number of small companies from different nationalities started dealing with oil-related business in Sudan such as electricity, telecommunications, refineries, marketing etc.

The main investors are:

Talisman Energy of Canada: entered Sudan in fall of 1998 by virtue of its acquisition of Arakis Energy (also Canadian), thereby becoming a 25% partner in GNPOC.

Petronas: the state-owned oil company of Malaysia has a 30% stake in the consortium. Petronas also has the "right of first refusal" on Talisman's 25% share in GNPOC, should Talisman withdraw.

China National Petroleum Corp: the state-owned oil giant of the People's Republic of China has the largest share of the GNPOC consortium: 40%. China is a major military supplier to the Khartoum regime; and continues to do nearly all the construction in the oil regions. It is believed that most of the15, 000 Chinese nationals working in Sudan are from the military, or have military training.

TotalFinaElf: of France/Belgium is not yet active in its huge concession areas (running as far south as Juba in Equatoria), but expected to begin active exploration soon.

BP Amoco: provided, in spring 2000, the critical $578 million investment in the PetroChina IPO.

OMV of Austria: which has a 26.125% stake in Concession Block 5a south of Bentiu, declared in March an "impressive" discovery at the Thar Jath-1 well.

Lundin Oil of Sweden, which has a 40% stake in Block 5a, works in partnership with OMV.

Agip of Italy (part of ENI): signed an agreement with Petronas in December 1999 for oil exploration in Sudan.

Royal Dutch Shell: owns a refinery in Port Sudan; the Dutch Trafigura Beheer BV has served as the initial agent for Sudanese crude oil exports.

Recommendations:

SHRO calls on the Government of Sudan:

• - to publicly acknowledge and condemn human rights violations committed against civilians in the region of oilfields by the government army, the PDF and other government-allied militias.
• to take active measures to ensure the protection of civilians in the war zones.
• to raise the conditions for the return of those civilians displaced from their homes in Western Upper Nile and Unity States, and compensate all those who lost their properties.
• to initiate an independent investigation into human rights violations reportedly committed by members of the government and government-allied forces, and to initiate yet another independent investigation into the employment of private military and security companies for training and supporting forces to protect the oil fields and facilities.
• to bring to justice any member of government or government-allied forces found to have been responsible for human rights violations in accordance with international standards for fair trial.
• to allow access (without any restriction) for humanitarian agencies and independent human rights monitors to all government-controlled areas including Unity State and Western Upper Nile.

SHRO calls on the oil companies present in Sudan to either suspend their operations there until the conflict is peacefully resolved (which would be most ideal) or:

• ensure that their operations do not contribute to human rights abuses and not to condemn such abuses when they occur.
• give guarantees that the company's infrastructure will not be used for military purposes that would result in human rights abuses.
• ensure adequate human rights training for any security personnel they employ to protect their staff and business interests.

SHRO calls on the international community:

• to condemn the human rights violations committed against civilians in the vicinity of oilfields.
• to pressure all sides to the conflict in Sudan to adhere to the international humanitarian law and to take active steps to protect the civilian population.
• to press for unrestricted access for humanitarian agencies and independent human rights monitors to all areas in Sudan especially the oil areas.
• to mointor business investment in Sudan according to transparent human rights criteria, and mointor transfers of arms to Sudan